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CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND SECURITY TRANSACTIONS1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
FORREST W. LACEY*

Two cases involving a claim of usury were decided during the
period of this survey. However, in one, Post Sign Co. v. Jemc's, Inc.,'
the court did not reach the issue of usury, but instead held that this
issue could not be raised by the parties involved. The facts were
somewhat complicated. A restaurant owner became financially embarrassed and needed to raise $65,000. The manager of the restaurant,
one McAshan, wanted to buy it, but could not raise the money. A
lender was found, but for tax reasons the lender bought the property
for $65,000, and immediately executed to McAshan a lease with
option to purchase for $110,000. Approximately a year later the
lessee, McAshan, exercised his option and consummated the purchase by execution of a note in the amount of $106,524, secured by a
purchase money trust deed. Two months later McAshan caused the
corporation Jemc's to be formed, and this corporation thereafter conducted the restaurant business. McAshan retained title to the real
estate for several months, but conveyed his interest therein to
Jemc's shortly before a general creditors' bill was filed against Jemc's.
The holder of the $106,524 note intervened in the general creditors'
proceeding and sought an order directing the receiver of Jemc's to
surrender possession of the real estate for foreclosure under the trust
deed. The receiver answered that the note transaction was tainted
by usury to the extent of $45,000 (the difference between the option
price and the amount the lender paid), that the intervenor was unjustly enriched by that amount, and that the receiver was entitled to
have the note purged of this amount. The chancellor upheld these
contentions, and entered a decree purging the note of $45,000.
On appeal, the chancellor's decision was reversed, and the court of
appeals held that the receiver of Jemc's could-not raise the question
of usury. The opinion is based upon the proposition that only the
victim of usury, or his creditors, may have usury purged from a
transaction. 2 As McAshan gave the note, and not the corporation
Jemc's of which he was sole stockholder,3 the court reasoned that only
McAshan or his creditors had a remedy for usury.
In response to a contention that Jemc's as grantee from McAshan
succeeded to his rights, the court relied upon an earlier Tennessee
*Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. 342 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
2. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1617 (1956), quoted 342 S.W.2d at 388.

3. According to the headnotes, 342 S.W.2d 385.
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decision to the contrary. 4 The case was not squarely in point, however, as it involved a voluntary purchaser who took with knowledge
of a deed of trust, and who presumably paid less by the amount of the
alleged usurious note involved. This distinction is noted in the section
of an encyclopedia cited by the court,5 but no mention of it is made
in the opinion.
Another contention rejected by the court was that the corporate
identity should be ignored. It had been stipulated that McAshan was
not personally liable for the debts of Jemc's and the court seemed
impressed that McAshan has been "scrupulous in his treatment of the
corporation as a separate entity."6 The court also accepted McAshan's
"inadvertent error" explanation for his having given, as additional
security for the note involved, a chattel deed of trust on property
which the organizational minutes recited as belonging to Jemc's. The
opinion acknowledges that some Tennessee cases ignore the corporate entity, but states that this is done only "to prevent injustice,
7
which element appears to us completely lacking in the case at bar."
One wonders if usury, which the chancellor found to exist, is not an
injustice.
A final argument advanced by the receiver was that the holder of
the note was unjustly enriched. To this the court replied that any
enrichment was at the expense of the original seller, rather than
Jemc's or its creditors. Obviously, however, the creditors of Jemc's
would have benefitted by purging the $45,000 alleged enrichment, or
the litigation would not have occurred.
An interesting contrast to the Jemc's case is Williams v. Burmeister,8
in which a claim of usury was upheld. The opinion consists largely
of a review of the facts, as the court disagreed with the chancellor
as to the preponderance of the evidence. Briefly, the facts were as
follows. One Williams owned real estate which had been sold to
satisfy a judgment. Desperately seeking to redeem the property, Williams first agreed to convey the property if the lender would pay off
$17,500 necessary for redemption, and to buy back the property for
$50,000 payable in installments. A deed was executed, and the grantee
paid $16,000 necessary to set aside the court sale. Later Williams
executed a note for $34,400 and a deed of trust to the same property to
secure the note. During the negotiations the lender-grantee told
Williams he did not want the land but would help him to redeem it.
Upon default in payment of installments due on the note, the lender4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Nance v. Gregory, 74 Tenn. 343 (1880).
91 C.J.S. Usury § 130, at 718-19 (1955), cited 342 S.W.2d at 388.
342 S.W.2d at 389.
Id. at 390.
338 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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grantee conveyed title to a bona fide purchaser for $32,000.
On these facts the court found a fiduciary relationship to exist
between grantor and grantee, a trust, and usury. The warranty deed
was declared to be a mortgage, and the transaction purged of all
usury. With respect to the usury allegation the court stated that "the
entire transaction was clearly usurious. Burmeister agreed to advance
funds totalling approximately $20,000. In return therefor he was to be
repaid the amount of $35,000 . . .9
The court then quoted from an earlier case as follows:
All attempts to evade the usury laws are watched by the courts with
anxious jealousy, and promptly put down. Such attempts as the
present . . .have been universally held to be usurious, no matter what
kind of property has been given instead of money, if the design of the
parties at the time was that money was to be obtained upon it. Indeed,
vain would be our usury laws if such were not the case. I will not lend
you money; oh, no, I cannot legally charge" more than 6 per cent for
money, but I can charge you what I please for any property . . . [I]t is

the worst and most dangerous of all attempts at usury, because, generally,
the most difficult of detection.lO
9. Id. at 652.
10. Swanson v. White, 24 Tenn. 373, 378 (1844).

